關于組織應收賬款管理戰(zhàn)略方針一些經驗證據文獻翻譯

原文：A Strategic Approach on Organizing Accounts Receivable Management: Some Empirical Evidence1. Introduction Firms rarely require immediate payment for their merchandise. For example, in the UK corporate sector more than 80% of daily business transactions are on credit terms and accounts receivable constitute one of the main assets on corporate balance sheets (35% of total assets) As soon as trade debtors settle their accounts, cash flows into the company. At the same time, however, new sales generate new accounts receivable. The level of debtors thus remains constant when sales figures are stable, while it grows as sales figures increase. Although firms extending trade credit heavily invest in accounts receivable, the resulting financial need is not the only reason why trade credit decisions merit more careful attention. This paper develops and discusses two additional considerations. First, firms selling on credit open themselves to moral hazard. When exchange relations are subject to imperfect information, this uncertainty results in transaction costs. Sellers thus have incentives to develop organizational structures that reduce the transaction costs resulting from this asymmetric information problem. Both homemade planning and sales structuring as well as balanced product and market portfolios can reduce this uncertainty, while externalization of risk becomes attractive when these homemade institutions fail. Second, vendors offering trade credit have to adopt a variety of new responsibilities: the decision whether or not to grant credit to a (new) customer, the assumption of credit-,administration- and collection-policies and the bearing of the credit risk involved. From a managerial point of view this means that the seller 1) finances the buyers inventory, 2) engages in additional accounting and collecting activities, 3) monitors the financial health of both existing and potential customers and 4) gets involved in assessing and bearing new risks. Not all credit management functions, however, have to be performed by the seller. Indeed, when extending trade credit is thought to add no real value to the firm, its management can be contracted to a third party. A selling firms decision to extend trade credit thus also requires the seller to decide whether or not to integrate into managing accounts receivable. Moreover, when the seller decides to enter a market transaction, several organizational structures can be employed. In their paper, Mian and Smith (1992) examine the relationship between the functions to be performed in the credit-administration process and the decision whether or not to subcontract these functions to a third party specialist. In this paper, however, the extension of trade credit is looked upon from both a more strategic and a risk-oriented point of view. The strategic approach is based on the extensive financial management literature claiming that the extension of trade credit can become advantageous to the supplier, in which there will be a need for flexibility in managing accounts receivable. The risk-oriented point of view, on the other hand, is based upon those principles that deal with the moral hazard problem. Finally, the implications of these motivational theories are linked to the industrial organization literature on vertical integration. Three types of outsourcing are considered. At first, the factoring contract has been chosen to operationalize the externalization of accounts receivable management, since factoring is the most comprehensive type of outsourcing a firms accounts receivable management. Next, we clearly isolate the decision to subcontract the administration process from the decision to subcontract the risks incurred, assuming that they are based on different decision processes with different decision variables. Indeed, we assume that both cost advantages and a need for flexibility in managing accounts receivable will cause integration of the firms credit administration. The assumption of credit risk, however, will not be delegated to a third party when the transaction can be performed in a stable and predictable environmental setting (inducing a low need for monitoring and control).2. The Nature of Outsourcing Contracts Before analyzing policy choices and their respective determinants, we first give a description of the basic governance structures studied. 2.1. FACTORING AND ITS EQUIVALENTFactoring basically offers three types of services: 1) finance, 2) risk control and 3) sales ledger administration. However, not all factoring contracts provide this full array of services. Based upon the scope of his managerial needs the seller can decide on the extensiveness of the contract. The most important distinction between factoring contracts is that between recourse and non-recourse agreements. A non-recourse agreement implies that the factor makes the credit-extension decision, monitors and collects the accounts receivable and bears the credit risk. Under a recourse agreement the firm selling on credit retains the risk of non-recovery of the debt. Moreover, when the contract provides financing, the factoring contract is called an advance-factoring contract. A full-factoring agreement then is a non-recourse agreement, providing financing for all credit sales (both national sales and export). The equivalents internalizing their accounts receivable management finance their accounts receivable out of general corporate credit and manage internally the credit-risk assessment, credit-granting, credit-collection and credit-risk bearing functions. 2.2. THE ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT CONTRACTThe companies using an administrative management contract are defined as those companies that use credit information agencies to assess the trade credit risks, to collect accounts receivable when they are due or ARF (Accounts Receivable Financing)-contracts and service contracts offered by a factor. Thus, although the administration of accounts receivable has been outsourced, the firm still bears the trade credit risk.2.3. THE RISK MANAGEMENT CONTRACT The risk management contract is defined as a contract that indemnifies firms against losses on uncollected accounts receivable but does not take care of the firms credit administration process. Examples of such third party specialists are e.g. credit insurance contracts and partial factoring agreements. 3.Determinants of Alternate Policies The factoring contract has been chosen to operationalize the full externalization of accounts receivable management. Next, we assume that the decision to outsource this management is inuenced by the need for exibility in extending trade credit and collecting payments on the one hand and the existence of economies of scale and scope reducing the unit cost of management on the other. Further, such a need for exibility and control is assumed to be induced by the existence of real motives for extending trade credit. Indeed, when these motives hold, trade credit contributes to the process of maximizing shareholder wealth, a traditional objective in nancial management literature, and becomes a strategic asset that is not likely to be extended to a third party. Next, the effects of uncertainty and bounded rationality in managing accounts receivable are studied, assuming that the suppliers risk increases as a result of uncertainty in the customers payment behavior and uncertainty in the suppliers business environment. The less predict-able the customers payment behavior, the higher the uncertainty in the suppliers nancial needs, all other things being equal. Therefore, the assumption of the credit risk becomes less attractive whenever the customers payment behavior is hard to predict. In addition, two types of environmental uncertainty have been withheld: the possibility to control the customers payment behavior (based on the absence of information-asymmetry) and the possibility to spread the risks incurred. Therefore, trade credit administration is described as the process of monitoring and collecting the outstanding accounts receivable. Moreover, since one cannot bear the consequences of decisions controlled by a third party, it is reasonable to assume that rms deciding to internalize the collection of their accounts receivable will also internalize the credit granting decision. The risk assumption includes the assumption of all responsibilities in case of late and/or bad payments.3.1 THE DSO-RATE Since in the traditional literature on accounts receivable management the average number of days sales outstanding (DSO) is often mentioned to be the primary reason for outsourcing, the DSO rate has been withheld for further analysis. Indeed, the pure financial theories on trade credit stress the fact that high DSO-rates increase the suppliers financial needs, increasing the likelihood of outsourcing. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that when the firm has no accounts receivable (although it provides its customers with the opportunity to delay their payments), there wont be any need for outsourcing its management. This results in the following hypothesis: Firms with a higher average number of days sales outstanding are more likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.2. COST ADVANTAGES Economies of scale and scope are expected to affect the outsourcing decision. Indeed, the xed costs associated with credit-risk assessment and monitoring and collection policies can be spread over a larger number of accounts as credit sales increase. Firms with higher credit sales are therefore expected to invest in more specialized personnel, techniques and knowledge, enabling them to realize learning-effects. 3.3.NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY AND CONTROL: THE INCENTIVES FOR TRADE CREDIT EXTENSION The more recent developments in accounts receivable management literature (e.g. Emery, 1988; Brick and Fung, 1984; Schwartz, 1974) all emphasize its potential strategic value which is usually translated into a set of motives causing trade credit extension. Among these we discern a pricing motive, an operating motive, a nanc-ing and a tax-based motive and a transaction motive. In what follows, each of them is briey discussed and translated into testable hypotheses. 3.3.1. The Pricing Motive The pricing motive is extensively described in Schwartz and Whitcomb (1978, 1979) and is based on the idea that both market structures and legal arrangements often restrict a rms protability by constraining price competition in the market. In such circumstances trade credit not only becomes an effective tool in creating hidden price-cuts; it can also be used to practice sub-rosa price discrimination (by extending different credit terms to different customers). This price-setting objective results in the following hypothesis: Suppliers who use trade credit as a price setting variable are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.2. The Operating Motive In addition, the operating motive for the extension of trade credit assumes that rms with higher inventory storage costs can transfer these costs onto the buyer by extending trade credit. That way trade credit offers the opportunity to split up the inventory cost into an operational storage cost to be borne by the buyer and a nancial opportunity cost induced by the payment delay offered by the seller. Therefore, Firms, in particular those with seasonal sales gures, can have a strategic advantage in extending trade credit. This strategic potential, however, increases even more whenever the customer has a comparative advantage in storing the delivered goods, which is more likely to occur when he transforms these into nished, non-perishable products. This results in the following hypothesis: Suppliers of semi-nished products with seasonal sales gures are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.3. The Financial Motive The nance-based models for the extension of trade credit as developed by Emery (1984, 1987, 1988), Schwartz (1974) and Chant and Walker (1988) argue that rms with ready access to additional nancing will extend trade credit to rms facing higher nancing costs or restricted nancing options. That way, the stronger and more liquid selling companies can help nance the growth of their smaller and more vulnerable customers, thereby enlarging and safeguarding their own future markets. Since these rms have incentives to act as a banker, they will be less inclined to outsource their control in managing accounts receivable. This results in the following hypothesis: The more liquid suppliers are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. 3.3.4. The Tax-based Motive Even in perfectly competitive nancial markets with homogeneous interest rates, trade credit can act as a redistributor of wealth since high tax paying suppliers have a lower after-tax nancing cost. That way, the tax-based models as introduced by Brick and Fung (1984a, 1984b) see trade credit as a redistributor of tax advantages between buyer and seller. They nally conclude that “ sellers with high effective tax rates will supply more trade credit and are therefore more likely to have a longer investment in accounts receivable”. Frank and Maksimovic (1995) follow this reasoning stating that the higher the suppliers tax rate, the higher his comparative tax advantage will be and the more willing he will be to invest in trade credit. His lower after-tax nancing cost induces the same incentives as discussed under the nancing motive, resulting in the hypothesis that: Suppliers who are in a higher tax-bracket are less likely to outsource their accounts receivable management. Source: Greet· Asselbergh, A Strategic Approach on Organizing Accounts Receivable Management: Some Empirical Evidence. Journal of Management and Governance,1999(3):pp15-20譯文：關于組織應收賬款管理戰(zhàn)略方針：一些經驗證據1 簡介企業(yè)很少需要為他們的商品立即付款。例如，在英國企業(yè)界超過80%的日常業(yè)務交易還在信用期限中，應收賬款成為構成公司資產負債表（總資產的35%）的主要資產之一。當有應收賬款回收入公司的賬戶，形成現金流量流入公司，與此同時，又有新的銷售產生新的應收賬款。對債務人來說，當它的銷售額增長債務水平卻保持不變。雖然公司擴大貿易信貸、大量投資在應收帳款所造成的財政需要的不是唯一的原因，但貿易信貸決策更需要仔細注意。本文研究和討論了兩個額外問題。首先是企業(yè)對賒銷開發(fā)自己的道德風險承受能力。當交易關系受到不完全信息的影響，這種不確定性造成了交易成本。賣方因此鼓勵發(fā)展組織結構產生的成本，降低了這個信息不對稱的問題。這兩種自制規(guī)劃和銷售結構平衡的產品和市場的投資組合可以減少上述的不確定性,而風險外化使得這種不確定性風險開始導致這些自制的機構失敗。第二，供應商在提供貿易信貸時會采用一系統新職能：在決定是否將貿易信貸提供給一個新的信貸客戶，這涉及到信貸的管理和收集，信用政策以及信貸風險的承擔。從管理的角度這意味著賣方必須做到1）了解買方的庫存；2）從事額外的會計和收集活動；3）監(jiān)督現有和潛在客戶的財務狀況；4）評估和承受新的信貸風險。但是并不是所有的信用管理職能都必須由賣方進行。事實上，當擴大貿易信貸被認為沒有給公司帶來真正的價值時，貿易信貸可以承包給第三方執(zhí)行。一個銷售公司決定要擴大貿易信貸也要求賣方來決定是否融入應收賬款管理。此外，當賣方決定進入市場交易時一些組織結構可以被采用。在米安和史密斯（1992）的論文中研究了必須在信貸管理過程中執(zhí)行的職能，并決定是否將這些職能轉包給第三方專家的關系。在本文中，擴展商業(yè)信用是更具戰(zhàn)略性和風險導向性的觀點。戰(zhàn)略手段是基于廣泛的財務管理文獻，它們聲稱擴大貿易信貸對供應商有利，但其中需要有靈活的應收賬款管理。另一方面，風險導向性則是基于這些原則處理道德風險問題。最后，這些激勵理論聯系在一起組成了垂直整合產業(yè)組織。有三種類型的外包會被考慮到。首先，由于保理業(yè)務是外包公司應收賬款管理中最全面的類型，保理合同被選定為實施應收賬款賬戶管理的具體化方式。接下來，我們清楚地區(qū)分決定轉包分包所產生的風險管理過程，假設它們是以不同的決策變量和不同的決策過程為基礎。事實上，我們認為在成本優(yōu)勢和再管理應收賬款將造成該公司靈活管理貿易信用的需要。但是假設信用風險管理不委托于第三方時，交易可以在一個穩(wěn)定和可預見的環(huán)境設定（包涵低需求的監(jiān)測和控制）中執(zhí)行。2 外包合同的性質在分析政策選擇和他們各自的決定因素之前，我們首先給出一個基本的治理結構的描述研究。2.1保理業(yè)務及其等效功能保理業(yè)務基本上提供了三種類型的服務：1）金融；2）風險控制；3）分賬戶銷售管理。然而，并非所有的保理合同都提供這種全套服務?；谒麄児芾淼男枰?，賣方可以決定合同范圍。保理合同之間最重要的區(qū)別是協議有追索權和無追索權。無追索權的協議意味著當有因素使得信貸延期時，要監(jiān)控并收集應收賬款和承擔信貸風險。根據協議，公司在追索賒銷上保留了非債務回收風險。此外，當合同提供融資業(yè)務時，保理合同被稱為事前保理合同。全套保理合同是無追索權協議，為所有人提供信用銷售融資（包括國際銷售和出口）。其內在等值一般企業(yè)的應收賬款財務賬目管理、內部信用的風險評估和授信，信貸收集和信用風險承擔的職能。2.2行政管理合同企業(yè)使用行政管理合同意味著那些企業(yè)使用信用信息機構以評估貿易信貸風險，在應收賬款收取到期時提供的一個應收賬款融資合同和服務合同。因此，雖然應收賬款的管理已經外包，但企業(yè)仍帶有貿易信貸風險。2.3風險管理合同風險管理合同是指合同中約定了沒有考慮到該企業(yè)的信用管理過程服務而導致應收賬款無法收回使企業(yè)遭受損失。這樣的第三方專家的例子有：信貸保險合同和部分保理協議。3.代替政策的決定因素保理合同已被選定為實施應收賬款管理的具體化形式。接下來，我們假定外包這種管理的決定是由對擴大貿易信貸和收集支付款項的靈活性的需要，另一方面是減少對其他單位成本管理存在范圍經濟的靈活性。此外，這種靈活性和控制需要是假設由貿易信貸延長的真正動機所致。事實上，當存在這些動機的約束，貿易信貸有助于為股東創(chuàng)造最大的財富，成為一個不太可能擴展到第三方的戰(zhàn)略性資產。其次，對應收賬款管理的不確定性和有限理性進行了研究。假設客戶的付款行為及供應商的商業(yè)環(huán)境的不確定性會導致供應商的風險增加，則對客戶支付行為的可確定性就越少，供應商財務需求的不確定性就越高，其他所有條件都相等。因此，每當客戶的付款行為是難以確定時，對信用風險的假設就變得不那么有吸引力。此外兩種環(huán)境類型的不確定性已經扣除：控制客戶支付行為（在信息不對稱情況下）的可能性和擴大風險費用的可能性。因此，貿易信貸管理被描述為監(jiān)測和收集應收未收賬戶的過程。此外，既然不能承擔由第三方控制決定的后果，這就有理由假設企業(yè)決定其內在應收賬款回收也將使得授信決策內部化。風險承擔包括產所有責任以防產生推遲付款和壞賬情況的假設。3.1應收賬款平均回收期在傳統文獻中對應收賬款平均回收期（DSO）已經做了進一步的分析研究，經常會有提到應收賬款管理中的應收賬款平均回收期是導致外包的首要因素。事實上，單純的財務貿易信貸理論使得高平均回收期出現和供應商資金需求的增長。這增加了外包的可能性。此外，可以合理地假定，當企業(yè)沒有應收賬款（雖然給客戶提供了延遲付款的機會）就不會有任何外部管理的需要。這個假設的結果主要表現為：具有較高的應收賬款平均回收天數的企業(yè)更可能需要進行好自己的應收賬款管理。3.2成本優(yōu)勢規(guī)模經濟和范圍經濟預計將影響外包政策。事實上，當信用銷售增加時信用風險評估和監(jiān)測以及收款政策的固定費用也會增加。有較高信用銷售的公司將投入更多的專業(yè)人才和技術知識。3.3靈活性和控制能力的需要：貿易信貸的激勵措施在越來越多的對應收賬款管理研究的最新文獻中（如艾美瑞，1988；布瑞克和方，1984；斯瓦茨，1974）都強調其潛在的戰(zhàn)略價值，這通常被翻譯為一系列造成貿易信貸的機制。其中，我們認識到一個定價機制，一個經營機制，一個財務和基于稅收機制以及一個交易機制。接下來，對它們進行簡要介紹并轉化為可檢驗的假說。3.3.1價格機制在斯沃特茲和惠特科姆（1978,1979）的文章中詳細介紹了價格機制，這是根據市場結構和法律安排通常通過限制價格來限制市場競爭中公司的盈利能力為基礎的。在這種情況下，貿易信貸不僅成為創(chuàng)造隱藏削價的有效工具，也可以用來創(chuàng)造秘密價格歧視（通過擴展不同信用條件和不同客戶）。這個價格設置基于以下假設：作為一個供應商使用貿易信貸來設定價格是不太可能管理好自己的應收賬款的。3.3.2經營機制另外，為擴大貿易信貸的經營機制假設存貨成本較高的企業(yè)可以通過擴大貿易信貸來轉移給買方支付。這樣，貿易信貸就提供了機會將存貨業(yè)務成本分為買方的機會成本和由賣方提供的延遲付款引起的存貨成本負擔。因此，企業(yè)，特別是存在季節(jié)性銷售的企業(yè)可以有一個擴大貿易信貸的戰(zhàn)略優(yōu)勢。然而當客戶在貨物存儲中占優(yōu)勢時，這一戰(zhàn)略的潛在可能性會增加，這會使他們把這些轉換為不易變質的產品。這個結論基于以下假設：銷售季節(jié)性半成品的供應商不太可能管理好自己的應收賬款。3.3.3財務機制埃默里（1989,1987,1988），斯瓦茨（1974），恰特和沃克（1988）的研究中對擴大貿易信貸的財務模型認為，中小企業(yè)和隨時獲得額外融資的企業(yè)擴大貿易信貸會使企業(yè)面臨更高的融資成本或限制融資方案。這樣，更強大和更具流動性的銷售公司可以對小型和自我保護力低下的客戶提供資助，從而來擴大和維護自己的未來市場。由于這些企業(yè)有能力來充當銀行家的角色，他們會不愿意外包自己的應收賬款管理。這個結論基于以下假設：越是靈活的供應商越不會外包自己應收賬款管理。3.3.4基于稅收的機制即使在完全競爭的同類利率的金融市場中，貿易信貸也可以作為財富再分配。因為繳納高稅收的供應商有一個較低的稅后融資成本。這樣一來，布瑞克和方（1984）中提供的以稅收為基礎的模型把貿易信貸視為一種賣方和買方直接的再分配稅收優(yōu)惠政策。他們最后得出結論，“高實際稅率賣方將提供更多的貿易信貸，因此更可能有一個較長的應收賬款投資”。弗蘭克和馬克思穆文思（1995）按照這種推理，指出供應商稅率越高，他們的比較優(yōu)勢就越高也會更愿意投資于貿易信貸。他們較低的稅后財務成本產生了和財務機制中相同的激勵效果。這個結論基于一下假設： 擁有較高稅收負擔的供應商不太可能外包自己的應收賬款管理。出處：美格利特·埃爾斯伯格，關于組織應收賬款管理戰(zhàn)略方針：一些經驗證據，管理及治理期刊，1999（03），pp15-20。