創(chuàng)業(yè)融資[文獻翻譯]

本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計）外 文 翻 譯題 目 大學(xué)生創(chuàng)業(yè)融資渠道研究 專 業(yè) 財 務(wù) 管 理 一、外文原文原文：Entrepreneurial Financing The financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacerbating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup financing niche:At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem.This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice VCs often hold convertible preferred equity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.These questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to which Barry refers. By directly revealing the projects quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the VC. By contrast, if quality were signaledthe traditional solution to the adverse selection problemcostly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more information to convey. In otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. The two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.The first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive in entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. The “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. Yet, for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. With such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to pool at nearly any cost. As the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneursand thus to serve as a credible signaltend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. Costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.As testament to the empirical importance of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, Fried and Hans characterize the VC funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. This due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. The majority of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.The second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-like) financial contracts. The intuition behind this link is simple. By definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. High-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to screen out bad projects. In effect, high-powered contracts make the VC bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. Therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.To summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venture capital markets.Following the path-breaking empirical work of Saar, a theoretical literature on VC contract design emerged. One common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. A second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. For example, VCs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project risk or exit strategy.In part, the literatures reliance on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. It is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presence of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. Conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of publicly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and Lukin study a similar environment but split the firms claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public trading. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial finance markets since the assumption that drives their resultslosses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelastic demandhas no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1 with probability , where G, B is an indicator of project quality, and < 1 otherwise.Funded projects have expected value Vi = 1 + (1 ). It is assumed that < K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.Entrepreneurs have reservation value V; that is, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value V or higher. In a model of mature firm financing, V is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. Such an interpretation is valid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. The key difference is one of magnitude. Compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters. The net present value of projects, V V K, is assumed to satisfyEVG V K 0 EVB V K. (1)Equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” The net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. Finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfy(EG V K) + (1 )(EB V K) 0, (2)where is the proportion of good projects in the economy. Because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.One source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. This investor may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. Consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that can evaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes high-powered contracts in equilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor of funding all projects. Such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good entrepreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s G, B with Prs = G | entrepreneur is bad = Prs = B | entrepreneur is good = (3)The unconditional probability of a good signal is (1 ) + (1 ), so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(1 ) + (1 ) entrepreneurs before a good one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the VC for both capital contribution K and expected evaluation costs = C/(1 ) + (1 ) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing instead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts considered arbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance markets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC market.Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signaling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. For example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. Then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. But to the extent that the pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.Information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. This model may shed light on the usage of unit IPOs, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularly small, risky offerings. The inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. The logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motivate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.Finally, the models conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. A connection between information acquisition incentives and the shape of the security exists independently of the contracts origins. One could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raising money from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. The more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general partners information acquisition incentives.Source: Chris Yung. Entrepreneurial Financing And Costly Due Diligence. The Financial Review, 2009(44),pp137-149.譯文：創(chuàng)業(yè)融資由于缺乏融資的信用記錄以及所經(jīng)營公司存在的風(fēng)險性，初創(chuàng)企業(yè)的融資通常情況下都需要很高的逆向選擇成本。更糟糕的是，通常情況下，創(chuàng)業(yè)者擁有豐富的科技知識，但是缺乏信用積累，也沒有渠道傳遞自己的信用。 巴里認為風(fēng)險資本正好填補了創(chuàng)業(yè)資本的空缺： 在小規(guī)模階段，風(fēng)險資本進入資本市場是受限的。想必并不是所有創(chuàng)業(yè)者都能依靠自有資金創(chuàng)業(yè)，或是依靠銀行或者天使投資人填補空缺。風(fēng)險資本家為他們提供了一項為在風(fēng)險情境中使用而特意設(shè)計的資金。風(fēng)險資本家們通過預(yù)先的嚴格評估以及此過程收集的信息可以大大降低逆向選擇成本。 按照巴里的說法，這些問題可以通過昂貴的盡職調(diào)查反映出來。通過直接揭示項目質(zhì)量，減少創(chuàng)業(yè)者和風(fēng)險資本家之間的信息不對稱。另一方面，如果質(zhì)量是可以發(fā)出信喜的，那么昂貴的盡職調(diào)查就是不必要的。換而言之，盡職調(diào)查和發(fā)出信息都可以解決逆向選擇問題，這兩種方法是相互替代的，所以重點是誰更具有性價比。 這種看法存在幾個問題。為什么假設(shè)銀行不能（或者不選擇）作為一個風(fēng)險投資者進行嚴格評估？為風(fēng)險情境“設(shè)計”風(fēng)險資本是什么意思？當(dāng)人們注意到直接負債被作為逆向選擇問題的解決法案而實際上風(fēng)險投資家們卻經(jīng)常持有可轉(zhuǎn)換優(yōu)先股，人們會倍感疑惑。事實上，從預(yù)期收益與權(quán)益部分不成正比或者完全顛倒的意義上看，合約有強大的約束力。 像巴里指出的，這些問題可以通過高昂的嚴格的評估以反映解決。通過直接揭示項目的質(zhì)量，可以減少企業(yè)家與投資家的信息不對稱。相比之下，如果質(zhì)量是能夠被我們了解，那么昂貴的盡職調(diào)查是不必要的，因為我們不必了解其他。換而言之，無論是昂貴的盡職調(diào)查還是訊息都可以解決逆向選擇問題。這兩種機制是可以相互替代的；這樣問題就變成了哪個性價比更高。 論文的第一貢獻是證明在企業(yè)金融市場上消息是昂貴的，盡職調(diào)查也是如此。然而，對于新創(chuàng)公司，如果籌集不到資金，那么公司可能幾乎沒有價值。不良企業(yè)家試圖在任何成本下聯(lián)營。正如分析表明，證券的吸引力不足會使不良企業(yè)家轉(zhuǎn)而離開，事實上，證券對于優(yōu)秀的企業(yè)家也是如此沒有吸引力。昂貴的盡職調(diào)查便作為首選解決方案出現(xiàn)。 根據(jù)以往得知的風(fēng)險資本市場上的盡職調(diào)查成本的重要性，弗瑞德和漢斯里奇把創(chuàng)業(yè)資本融資過程描述為六個逐步嚴格的階段。在第一輪資金啟動前，這種盡職調(diào)查平均需要花費97天的時間方能完成。大多數(shù)的資本方案無法成功通過第一階段審查，更別說后續(xù)審查了。完整的融資過程被描述成“比銀行貸款參與性更高”。 本文的第二個貢獻是在昂貴的盡職調(diào)查與高級(或股權(quán)等)金融合同建立起聯(lián)系。這種聯(lián)系背后是簡單的洞察力。根據(jù)定義，低級合同是安全的。也就是說，各公司的預(yù)期收益間差別不大。高級合同放大了投資的優(yōu)劣項目間在收益方面的差別，從而放大了篩選不良項目的激勵。實際上，高效的合同使得風(fēng)險資本家能夠承擔(dān)選擇不良企業(yè)家的費用。因此，高效的合同鼓勵盡職調(diào)查?？傊@個模型研究的有三點：（1）昂貴評價帶來的預(yù)期好處；（2）這種昂貴評價作為解決傳統(tǒng)逆向選擇問題的方案；（3）傳統(tǒng)解決方案是由與風(fēng)險資本市場對應(yīng)的參數(shù)模型所主導(dǎo)的。繼薩爾曼開創(chuàng)性的工作之后，一種關(guān)于創(chuàng)業(yè)資本家合同設(shè)計的理論文獻出現(xiàn)了。這些論文的一個共同點是，他們使得可轉(zhuǎn)換債券最優(yōu)的觀點合理化。這個模型的第二個共同點是代理成本的引入。例如，風(fēng)險資本家和企業(yè)家對待項目風(fēng)險以及退出戰(zhàn)略有不同的偏好。某種程度上，這篇文章對代理成本的依賴歸功于對他們的相關(guān)經(jīng)驗充分信任。這大概也關(guān)系到上述共識：由于債務(wù)被認為是對逆向選擇的最佳應(yīng)對，非債務(wù)證券必然意味著另一種市場摩擦的存在。另一方面，我們可以很清晰的知道權(quán)益資本如何導(dǎo)致權(quán)益類證券。通過給予雙方大致對稱的回報，關(guān)于未來行動的利益沖突會被減輕。當(dāng)然，從目前的模型無意透漏的代理問題表明他們并不是重要的經(jīng)驗。相反，教訓(xùn)是，代理成本不是權(quán)益類證券的必要條件。也許令人驚訝的是，與本文關(guān)系最密切的理論成果載于公開交易證券的分析。假設(shè)流動性是外源的，價格有競爭的市場決策者決定，布特和薩克雷的研究表明：將證券分類成信息敏感類證券和安全類證券能夠增加或者減少經(jīng)營者發(fā)布信息的激勵機制。弗朗哥和盧金研究了一種類似的環(huán)境，但是將公司權(quán)利分類成外售部分和保留部分，再次分析證券設(shè)計和信息采集的相互作用。兩個重要的區(qū)別決定了我的結(jié)果，除了這些公開交易的模型。首先，這些模型排除信號，所以它不可能審查傳統(tǒng)的逆向選擇解決方案是否是主要的，如果是這樣，那要看在什么樣的環(huán)境下。其次，目前還不清楚這些公開出售模型如何擴展到創(chuàng)業(yè)資本市場，原因是驅(qū)動其結(jié)果的假設(shè)，即完全無彈性的需求流動性交易者的損失，無法與創(chuàng)業(yè)資本環(huán)境相適應(yīng)。資本投資是創(chuàng)業(yè)者不可缺少的一部分。投資項目的價值在1和之間，G, B，代表項目質(zhì)量，否則1.投資項目預(yù)期收益值V= i1 + (1 )，當(dāng) < K時。否則，此模型也承認無風(fēng)險債務(wù)，這將消除不利選擇問題。創(chuàng)業(yè)者必須保證當(dāng)前資產(chǎn)的價值V，加上剩余索取權(quán)之后，若能夠達到預(yù)期價值，那么合同就是可以接受的。在一個成熟企業(yè)的融資模型里，V被定義為當(dāng)前資產(chǎn)的價值，因為這是在沒有新的投資情況下公司的價值。從創(chuàng)業(yè)環(huán)境看，這種解釋是合理的，而且，由于沒有融資吸引力，創(chuàng)業(yè)者只能依靠現(xiàn)有資本。區(qū)別只是融資數(shù)量。與成熟企業(yè)相比，對于初創(chuàng)企業(yè)，當(dāng)前資產(chǎn)的價值是很小的，相對于其他參數(shù)（比如K 和）來說。項目的凈現(xiàn)值，假定滿足EVG V K 0 EVB V K （1）方程(1)用來衡量一個項目的價值。當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)該項目是優(yōu)良的時候，項目的凈現(xiàn)值才是正的。最后，假定凈現(xiàn)值滿足(EG V K) + (1 )(EB V K) 0 (2)其中是經(jīng)濟體系中優(yōu)秀項目的比重，由于凈現(xiàn)值平均值為正，所以該模型承認混同均衡。資金的一種來源是那些依據(jù)觀察進行信用評價的，對企業(yè)不甚了解的投資者。這種投資者可能會被認為是競爭激烈的商業(yè)信貸市場的代理人。根據(jù)這一解釋，很明顯，這個投資者需要平衡債務(wù)。簡單的說，當(dāng)一個人不了解情況時，他就會用傳統(tǒng)的方法解決逆向選擇問題。正如在引言提到的，這種方法就是負債。資本的另一個來源是擁有評估項目質(zhì)量好壞的能力的投資者。這種投資者被成為風(fēng)險投資家。這種看法還認為，風(fēng)險資本家一般選擇高質(zhì)量的合同。同樣的，風(fēng)險資金家通常選擇采用技術(shù)進行篩選，而以前這種做法并不明顯。特別是，如果融資合同是非常大度的（留給風(fēng)險投資家大量股份），那么放棄對投資項目進行評估將是有利可圖的。這樣的結(jié)果對于不良企業(yè)家是有利的，因為他們太想吸引到資金證明他們能夠得到好公司的垂青，從而獲得融資。通過限制聯(lián)營，昂貴的盡職調(diào)查可以使得不良企業(yè)家轉(zhuǎn)變成好的企業(yè)家，在此過程中，好的項目會得到真正的投資。創(chuàng)業(yè)者尋求的融資形式是不分優(yōu)劣的，而風(fēng)險資本家有一個評價等級。對于每一個創(chuàng)業(yè)者，付出的成本C和風(fēng)險資本家收到的訊息S G, B滿足Prs = G | 不良創(chuàng)業(yè)者 = Prs = B | 優(yōu)秀企業(yè)者 = (3)一個好的信號的概率為(1 ) + (1 )，所以風(fēng)險資本家一般用1/(1 ) + (1 )來評價創(chuàng)業(yè)者。融資合同要有足夠的優(yōu)惠，以彌補風(fēng)險投資家的資本貢獻K和預(yù)期評估成本，優(yōu)惠= C/(1 ) + (1 )。這個模型承認貝葉斯納什均衡的三種類型。在分離均衡中，良好的創(chuàng)業(yè)者提供一個安全環(huán)境而不良企業(yè)家都不喜歡這樣效仿。由于只有好的公司會積極參與，所以逆向選擇被采用的情況越來越少。風(fēng)險資本均衡作為后備方案。在這種情況下，企業(yè)家的合約吸引著投資者去評價公司的價值。最后，聯(lián)營可以被看作是良好的創(chuàng)業(yè)者認為上述兩種解決逆向選擇問題的方案太過昂貴的的無奈之舉。在本文中，我并沒有重視債務(wù)和證券資本。此前草案考慮了所有的證券，產(chǎn)生了這種直覺：高效率的證券促進盡職調(diào)查，而低效的證券對信號有更強的影響。證券等級的嚴格限制簡化了證券的認知，保留了關(guān)鍵的直覺，并使我的研究成果與現(xiàn)代文獻相比較。本文認為，在創(chuàng)業(yè)資本市場上，項目質(zhì)量比信息質(zhì)量的更具成本效益比。這個主題牽扯到一個實證文獻，即在這個市場上，實證調(diào)查是非常廣泛的。事實上，盡職調(diào)查是風(fēng)險資本市場的顯著特征。該模型的幾個特征是非常明顯的，讓人覺得這種機制是解決逆向選擇問題最佳替代方法。在一個更豐滿的模型中，這兩個機制可以作為互相補充的部分來運作。一般來說，一個角色都存在著創(chuàng)業(yè)信息和風(fēng)險資本家的盡職調(diào)查。該文件的草擬方案顯示互補性可以由多種方式觸發(fā)。比如，假設(shè)企業(yè)家有很多混亂的私人信息。最安全的方式可能還是收集信息，從而通過所獲得的信息篩選創(chuàng)業(yè)者。但只要存在不確定性，即使是自我選擇之后，昂貴的盡職調(diào)查仍是有利的。信息的獲得發(fā)生在風(fēng)險資本市場。該模型能夠揭示首次公開發(fā)行單位的用途，這些公開發(fā)行單位通常以股票和認股權(quán)證的形式用于小而有風(fēng)險的產(chǎn)品。認股權(quán)證的加入從逆向選擇角度看令人費解，因為現(xiàn)有文獻認為證券主要強調(diào)不良環(huán)境的回報。本文的邏輯表明，這些認股權(quán)證強調(diào)極致的好的環(huán)境，激勵投資者在進行項目評估時，當(dāng)其他逆向選擇解決方法過于昂貴時，選擇使用認股權(quán)證。最后，該模型的結(jié)論不依賴于良好企業(yè)家選擇合同這個假設(shè)。信息采集的激勵和安全之間的關(guān)系獨立于合同本身而存在。人們可以在一個風(fēng)險投資基金里尋找一個普通合伙人籌集資本，宣布基金持有何種證券。越是權(quán)益類證券，普通合伙人獲得的信息、獲取的激勵越強。出處:克里斯容.企業(yè)融資和昂貴的盡職調(diào)查.金融評論，2009（44）：P137-149.